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Though the subject of this pamphlet is one of
grave concern to all Americans--survival in the face
of the threat of thermonuclear wa-the author points
out that his solutions will not find popular acceptThe Peace Education Program of the American
Friends Service Committee feels that this point d view
should be given an opportunity for expression and it
is in the spirit of furthering discussion on the vital
issues of disarmament and peace that the pamphlet is
being published. It was originally delivered as an address entitled "The Case for Unilateral Disarmament"
on December 2, 1968 before the American Association
€or the United Nations in Santa Barbara, California.
ance.

EDITOR'S NOTE

W. H. Ferry has had long experience in newspapr work and as a consultant in l a h r xelations.
More recently he was partner in a public relations
firm in New York City.
I

Introduction
On January 13, 1960, a letter that I wrote advocating unilateral die
armament waa printed in the Santa Barbara News-Press. Though it was
far from an original suggestion, the proposal was in general greeted with
the outrage usually accorded ideas on their first appearance. Since that
time, the idea has got into the open a bit, and while it has not achieved
respectability, it still is making an h o n a l appearance in discussion.
I welcome this develomuent. because I continue to believe that unilateral
disarmament is the pktialway out of our agonizing dilemma.
Mr.Herman K a h , a physicist and military strategist of international
reputation on the staf£ of the Rand Coqmration, has argued many tima
for what he GLUs a mom redistic and calm attitude toward nudear war?
He has said he wants to change the atmosphere, to persuade people that
nuclear war is not, in the words of President Eisenhower, ''madness." but
the opposite: both possible and under certain cimrmstancea manageable.
Many would agree with Mr. Kahn. I have been reminded often that
u n i l a d dhma&nt t politidly unacceptable today. Indeed, one
can hardy be unaware that the entire drift of the country has been in
the opposite d i d o n . One day soon we may find o m I v e s committed
to a "doomsday machine," a device capabIe of blowing up the entire
earth. Aside from the faa that it might take ten years and tens of billions
of doIlars to build, a doomsday machine even to the most stalwart pa&
might seem to ham certain s h o r t d n g s , But since it may be technically
possible to consma, what is there in our present logic against the no.
tion? If it would give us the "balance of power" that haunts the dream
of statamen and suategists, are we not in honor bound to build it?
I shall leave the argument for the doomsday machine to those who
are more persuaded of the rhetoric of deterrence than I am. Moreover,
I do not intend to spend much time in reciting the grisly b a t s that
thermonuclear warfare has in its cupboard. For thae who might not be
fully aware of the consequenca d present programs I recommend a
pamphlet calIed Community of Fear.= My purpose in the following
pages is similar to Mr. Kahn's. I, tw, wish to change the atmosphere.
I want to see the a h discussion of unilateral disarmament made p
sible; and to that end, I propose to dissect the M e d "realism" on
which present policies are based.
1Herman

iw,esr pp.

aahn, On Th6nnonuclear War (Princeton: P r i n m n U n i d t y hesa,

2 Hm-rhn Bmwn md Jam- R d , Communify of F w r (huhBarbara, CPUfomin,
Center for the Study of Demwacic W t u t b , 1980). 40 pp.

M d v e l t i Redumated
As a beginning, let w imagine that Mr. Khrushchev haa recalled
Machiavelli and asked his advice on how to a c m e his main aims? And
k t us assume that chief among these aim is eventud domination of the
globe. I think that Machiavelli might say something like this:
"Prince, it is obvious that your weapons cannot assist you in achieving a single important goal. If you use them, whatever the situation M
pretext, three things will iolIaw. First, you wilI render some of the best
industria1 and building sites on earth uselm and uninhabited. Second,
you will be fearfully lmmbed yourself, which cannot be expected to
endear you to your subjects. Third, those people now labekd neutral
and uncommitted will never trust or follow your lead. But I need not
speak further on this line; I am sure we agree that your stockpiles of
great bombs and missiles are good only for national vanity, and perhaps
to balance the arms of your adversaries, but otheMise far more trouble
than they are worth."
Machiavelii continues. "We both know also chat the remarkable
gains that your country has made in the last haif-generation have been
made not mainly by force of arms but by deviousness. You have succeeded by infiltration, You have provided simple Communist answers
to immense problem of social organization for people who want to share
in the plenty of industrial society. Your diplomacy has been wily and
farsighted. Your encouragement of scientific development has won you
respect, if not friendship, in many parts of the world. You have a considerable accomplishment in the field of peaceful economic competition.
And dapite heavy arms burdens you have so far managed to keep your
own subjects relatively happy; though I must mnEm that they appear
to be far easier to satisfy than I would be.
"t
I wish to propose, Prince, is that you lay dawn your arms.
Not today or tomorrow, but after preparation of the kind I shall now
outline. First and most Wcult, you must bring China into your plan.
Second, you must make menacing noises at the West, more menacing
even than you made at Paris and in New York. The object here is to
get the West to commit itself even more expensively to arms build-ups,
and to enter into more and more "defense" paas and economic aid
agreements with other countries. Next, your various negotiators in
Geneva and elsewhere will denounce their o p p i t e numbers from the
West as intractable and thirsting only to go to war. Fourth, you will
prepare your nation for peacetime production and life. You will make
plans for shifting missile and arms factories into civilian goods. You will
figure out how the officers and men ofthe Russian army can be convertd
into schoolrnchers, mechanics, technical assistance teams, farmers, civil
-ants,
white mllar workers, colonizers. This will all take time but
8 I am indebtcd to a mlhgue. Hdhck Hobutn, for many of the ideas in the
Pollowing rehamation.
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should not be a difficult problem since y o m is a systematic economy
whose ends and means are directed from the top. These mangeinen#
can, moreover, be made publicly, for the West c a n k trust& not to
believe its eyes. In fact, these days it is a curious penchant of both East
and West to d
l things by their opposites. A writer named OrwelI d d
this language of opposites Newspeak. So evidence of peace preparations
on your part, it may be confidently predicted, will be w d e d in
Washington as preparation for war."
MachiaveUi smiles out of the window of rhe Kremlin and continues,
"Before 1 come to the h a 2 pints, I wish to say that I realize bat the
step I have been d d b i n g are not simple to take. I have mentioned
China already, and that will be a tough nut to m&. You'll probably
fare k t in Peking by showing that what you are going to do is in the
most orthodox Marxist fine. I appreciate also that you will have
domestic tribulations, especially with your older and more warlike and
less imaginative mlkagua in this building. Some of the brighter and
more open-minded chaps will see that the method X am suggesting is
the swift and cheap way to their heart's desire, world domination. Others,
I understand, want your job, and may denounce you as spineless or
masunable in espousing such a course. But in such bureaumatic infighting you have no peer between Tashkent and Leningrad. My advice
here would therefore be supererog;ltion.
'We come now to the 6fh step. You will a l l a special meeting of
the United Nations, and give your call so portentous a sound tbat the
heads of state of the entire world will come to New York. You will
announce h t as of the date of your a,Russia is disarming down
to the anm needed for domestic police. The m y is being disbanded.
Military detacbmmts are being recalled and demobilizad. The arrarent of
China, and its cooperation in this action, has been obtained. The borders
of the USSR w i l l hence£& be open to all. Anyone who cares to do so
may inspect any part of Russia without let or hindrance.
"Russia is taking this unprecedented action, bemuse it is genuinely
a peace-loving power. Rwiansi see that the armrr race can have no end
except war of an immensity that will leave the worId bloody and impvmished for generations. Against its wishes the Soviet was f
d into the
arms race by the West. Now, at the height of its power, demonstrably
able to emel in this bightful competition, Russia chases to act for
humanity. For it is now clear that to continue to prepare for war is
m n w or later to bring war on. There a n be no winners, only losers,
inmodern war. The Soviet is moreover confident that in a world at peace
its aima will be achieved betause oaf the superiority of its doctrineh
'The atomic materials of the Sdviet will be deli&
to tbe United
Nations, except for those amounts needed for pea&
atomic power
pIanta in Russia and other eomtria Ruasia o h to take a leading part
in the formation by the UN of a Pea= Farce. Xnterplaaerq rocket
research by the USSR and other scientific developments of the urnat

significance to mankind will l i k k be de-nationalized and turned over
to the United Nations."

Machiavelli pauses for a long moment and resumes, "And, Prince,
you then say what you intend to do with the capital set Ewe by unihteral.
disarmament. You are, I believel spending something around 30 billion
dollars a year for war? This, the UN Ieam, will be committed in the
future as folIows: 15 billion to the upbuilding of the Soviet economy,
and that of its neighbors and old friends. The next I0 billion is to be
spent, beginning at once, to meet the needs of the swdled neutral and
underdeveloped countries. Some of tbis amount will be channeled
through the United Nations, to the extent that the mganization can
handle such tasks and to the degree that other UN members are willing
and able to share in the effort. The Soviet ofirs to underwrite, out of
its savings on armsl the cost of administering this vastly expanded UN
machine. The Iast 5 biIlion is to be set aside--and, Prince, if I do say
so myself, 1 think this is rather a pretty suggestion-this h
1 5 billion
will be set aside for the use of tbe United States and its allia-to be
thought of as a Reverse Mafshall Plan. This is not only a poetic but a
necessary provision, since the West dearly has no plans whatever for
coping with peac~"
Machiavelli stands and looks down at Khmshchw. "Prime, you
end this most memorable of speeches with a statanent of your expxtatiom. You expect that some of the satelli-Poland,
Hungary, Rumania,
0th-will
pull away-but you expect aIm that they will return before
long. Where, after all, will they have to go?
"You expect that the neutral and ambitious new nations will turn
to the Soviet in gratitude. You expect that Africa and Indonesia will
come to your side with pledges of good will, and that it will not be long
before South h e r i a throws off its thralldom to the United States to
join you. In the United Nations Rwia's voice will instantly become
the dominant one. You expea that the Soviet's ofkr of capital and
techaid assistan- will be taken up everywhere.
"You do not expect that the United States or other Western nations
wiU bomb Russia-what good would it do? Y w do not expect that the
West will attempt to take Russia and China over. You expect that the
force of world opinion will stifle such sugptiws before they are even
made. The West wilI, in any m e , be facing the prodigious task of
keeping its own economies ailoat. You expect that the United Nations
wili accept the sweral challenp you have laid before it: that of malGng
great new st&
of atomic materials available where they will be of the
most use, that of enormously extending technical assistance, that of
forming an internarional Peace Force.
"Alas, bemuse of the suspicions which have been converted into the
way of life called the cold war, the West annot be expeaed soon to
follow your lead. No, the W a t must be expected to disbelieve you
indekitely, and to spend yeaxs inspecting and probing into every mve
in the Urals, every snowbank in Siberia.

"Mat of all you expect that the West will be thrown into the
confusion. Think of its iaternational arrangements-pacts, ece
nomic aid, CIA adventurers, miIitary bases, and exports of troopbillions in &iIe installations, submarines,warning systems, and the like1
Think of all of this as the response to a single image of Russia, the image
of a bloodthirsq and d t y beast, a11 dam and fangs, waiting ta pounce.
I need not elaborate this figure of speech, for it is the piccure of the West
you have sought to give your own subjects. But think what happens
when, in a twinkling, this beast is transformed into a harmless dove1
"Confusion is doubtless too mild a way of desmibing what would
ensue in the West. The domestic economy, especially of the United
States, would be thrown into great disarray--how great may ke surmised
by the total unwillingness of its leadm to make any preparation for
peace. Should they keep on making Polaris submarines, a full line of
missilea, warplanes, and so on? W h y ? What for? These will be hard
questions for tbe West to answer. But the true chaos will be psychologicaL Santeone will have to be bIamed fm the debacle. hpegmts are
needed when anything g w wrong, and the search for them will be
frantic Remember Pearl Harbor?
"But what you find? expect, Prince, is that your step will Iead to
peace. Peace, peace, there's the idea. You will offeryour assistance to
the United Nations not only in getting an international Peace Form
under way but in the far more immediate task; of keeping down the
distribution of atomic weapons and gas and microbes to other nationu.
You could come clase to dictating in the UN how these conmh and
cttrb are to be im@.
You may expect your good offices to be used in
many plam besides the UN,for you will now be known as the country
&at broke the most vicious arde man has ever known, the circle of
lethal Wc. But naw I am getting into details, and I shall desist. As
you see, my advice is simply conceived: it merely revthe present attim& In a word, disarm to parley-and win. Think it over, Prince.''
And MaehiaveU returned to the sixteenth century.

utmost

Phe polities ot peuce
I favor unilateral disarmament by the United States. In advomting
it, I do not wiPh to be associated with MachiaveLli. Peace is the purpose
I have in mind, not domination. By unilatmul disarmament I mean
that I belime that this cosrntty should lay down its arms, scrap its
warplanes, missiles, and stabrnohes, disband its troops, and leave itself
only the organization and weapons needed for local police and for
norrnal patrols of its borders.
Needless to my, I should want such a step to Ire taken only after

informing those with whom we have alliances of our intentions and
giving them time to make their own plans. I see nothing wrong with
similarly informing the Soviet and much to gain by doing so. The
object is peace, not scoring points on Russia. Detailed plans for dealing
with the unprecedented psychologi~land economic strains on our mun-

I
try would need ta be made Murehand, Our atomic war materials would
be entrusted to the United Nations, which we would aid also in estab
M n g a Peace Force, and in greatly expanding its pmgrams in lw
developed countries.
Most of all I would, before the event, put the k s t brains in the
country to work on the quation brilliantly posed by Walm MWs:
How would power be used in international affairs if war were forsworn
as an instrument of policy? What would power mean? How, in a completely disarmed world, would isurn be resolved rhat throughout history
have been adjudicated by the threat of force or by war itsel£?' President
Eisenhower's dictum is that "war is unthinkable." In a reversal, many
Arnerias today believe that peace is unthinkable. Tbis inability to
visualize a politim of peace may be much of the q h t i o n £or our
unwilfingna to negotiate seriously about disarmament. The d i h I t y
is in the Amerimn imagination. It is not disarmament that so much
bothers the citizenry as the inability to imagine how arguments, large
and s m d , w d d thereafter be settled. It is admittedly difficult to think
of national power irrevombly separated from national arms, which are
the historic means of enforcing political decisions. Berlin is a prime
instance. In the case of that troublesome phoenix it wodd probably
appear to the Russians as much as to ourse1vm that arms and only arms
are the means of deciding the citp's fate.
Lest this appear to be mdusive on the need for war-making =pabilities, however, we had better at the same time have a look at Cuba,
and indeed at alI of South America. Our a m capacity does us littIe if
any good there. The Caribbean situation shows how little we really
understand about power divorced from force. Hence the singularly inept
measures we have adopted in that area. W e have always preferxed
musde to mind So a prime prerequisite to unilateral disarmament would
be an analysis and understanding of power in a world in which war no
longer mn decide anything except the extent of national suicide. It
would take two to three years, perhaps more, but I gladly accept the
need for "lead time" to put unilateral dbrmament into effect.
SeveraI schema for unilateral action have been put forward of
which the most thoughtful is that of Charles E. Osgood, of the University of IUinois.6 Howwer, to the best of my knowledge, no one has
tried ta make the expert appraisd of the possibilities of unilateral disarmament that Mr. lCahn and his colleagues at the Rand Corporation
have, for example, made of thermonuclear war. Suggestions to competeat
groups that such a study be undertaken have been turned down. The
Walter Adillis, "The Peace Game," Saturduy Review, Sept. 24, 1980.
r t a p , in the expectation that a
h h i t takeu
by tbja country win be marched by the Soviefa. O+s
argument b that the h p r taut thing is to turn around while there i e still time, that it is
to the United
States to take the initlatiye, and that we have w q t h h g to p i n by thus bringing the
force ofworld opinion to bmr. S e Charla O
s
m
,"A Case 601.GradUnUattraI
Dhggemmt," Bulktin of the Atomic Scimlhts. Apfl, 1960. pp. 127.131.
4 See

a

m i a a plan for d i i i n g by

-

literature on the subject is almost nonexistent. The unending abundance of intellectual effort that is going into the support of the arms
race will, I conjecture, appall the historians of the future, if there is a
future. That the choicest minds of our generation should, being thus
occupied, iind no time for the fundamentals of world peace and world
community is the ultimate disaster of dogma.

pOSdb~8COIU74?qW-B
0f d d d dk-nf
1 wish to make it as clear as I can that 1 do not think unilateral
di-ent
would be pleasant, or painIess, or easy for the country to
bear. And I realize that such a move would not guarantee peace. Aa
Iong as nuclear weapons exist anywhere there is the chana of catastrophe.
But the possible repcussions of unilateral disarmament would sureIy
appear worthy of serious inquiry.
What would be the consequences? In the few public discussions of
this suggestion that I know about, no one has yet said that he believed
the Russians would bomb this country, or any other country horn which
our atomic arsenal and military apparatus had been with&=.
The
most drastic consequence seen is that the Reds would take over. In this
view, the natiom of the world, the United States included, would moner
or later become Soviet satellites.
This is a fiercely disagreeabt prospect. But by terms of the argument, I must accept the possibility that this will happen. X must stipulate
each and every detail of such a tabover: Congress turned into a puppet,
our governors xeplaced by bctioaariers from the Kremlin, jackbooted
soldiers with Red Stars on their shoulders on streetamem, and Communism xepladng demomcy as the American way of life,
I do not believe for an instant that this would be the outcome; far
from it, as I shall argue in a moment. But I must be willing to agree on
the worst results of my policy rhat anyme can f m e e . My opponenu
might, after all, be right.
My mitiw, however, make the old error of confusing the possibility
of a Soviet takeover with the fwobability of such an action. Where they
are also wrong is in declaring that, because they think it will happen,
Communist domination is the purpose of my p p s a I . I think that
demmcy is demanstrabfy the most just form of government. I regard
freedom and justice as the navigating stars for mankind. I M e r M
y
with my aitics, perhaps, in having a higher r e s p a than they for the
durability of these virtues. I have confidence in their staying power, and
believe they will finally prevail over any adversity, I am against the
police state and for the democratic ideai; but I caunot see how our
present program are helping our ideals or hurting the police state

Possible

COnmqU8llce~for

o

w countriss

1 do not s u W k to the notion of Russia's overwhelming camptence in managing the ahirs of other countria, or in any other department, for that matter. There is a limit to everything, and certainly a
1 s t to the ability of any nation to run the world in the face of a unanimously adverse public opinion. If the Soviet w a e to disarm tomorrow
would we know how to set about running things throughout the Red
bloc, assuming for the moment the desire to do tm? Would we know how
to w our arms to cope with the peaceful resistance we would meet
everywhere at our attempts to dominate? I think not.
This is not to ray that other countries, now considered under our
are, might not fall into the Soviet camp. This wodd appear a callow
abnegation of trust until one considers the alternative, and can only be
condemned finally if it can be argued tbat thermonuclear war would be
better for the country in question than falling to the Reds. That is to
say, if the alternatives are what I believe they are for this countryunilateral disarmament or the Third and k t World War-it is only
an extension of the argument to apply it to other countries caught in
the squem between the two great powers--Japan or Great Britain, for
example. The lively controversy in England over uniIateral disarmament
centers on the question whether the &ed
nudear shield is not in
fact an inviation to annihilation.
There is some reason to expect, on the other hand, that the reaction
from other countries to unilateral adon by us would be gratitude and
thanksgving. Othm a n see perhaps more soberly tban we can what a
mdern war would mean. They are not dazzled by technology's biumphs,
nor do they have the heady serm of power that accompanies immense
strength. Theirs has not been the good fortune to Iive in a rich nation,
geographically insulated from the wars of recent generations, theirs not
the sensations of inherent superiority that such luck has engendered in
the American people. They are merely frightened, and hoping against
hope that the two great threatening brutes will h d a way to live
together More the worst occurs. I think that the weight of worId
opinion will be thrown to that nation that acknowledges the futility of
the arms race and takes the irrwoable step toward ending it, while at
the same time looking to the United Nations as the chief instrument for
maintaining peace and balance in the world. Much as we may m o l e
ourselves with the b h m e propsition that the more arms the more peace,
we do not deceive others who know horn experience that such preparations have never yet spelled anything but dtimate ~ d i c t

The alternutive-mr
The other alternative is war. My opponents, who favor preparing
for war, must be willing to go to war and must be W g to argue that
when thermonuclear war comes, it will prove to h a better way of
l81

accomplishing American aims than the me&& 1 am proping. My
opponents must stipulate the most drastic mnsequences of the course
they advocslte, as I have done.
For this almative, however, one need not do anp imagining of what
would happen. Daily the facts and forecasts pile up Both sides boast
of their overkill ability. A vivid definition of this completely madern
word is provided by Jama Real.0 Overkill means, he says, "pouring
another bucket of gasoline on a baby that is already burning nidy." I
shall not even use the most frightening data available; that is, 1 I
not
insist on the must drastic consequences, which would be annihilation.
Let me just use an estimate which says that a "modemte attack" on the
U,S. would kill 60 million at once, seriously injure another 20 million,
and destmy about half the homes and 35 per cent of the industry of the
nation. This estimate data back to early 1959; presumab1y in the intervening two years there have been enough of what are laughingly d e d
te&nic;tl improvements ta raise that figure. But let it stand. Let stand
beside it the 20 to 30 million Russians that we might be able to &troy
in retaliation. And beside this let w eliminate horn the face of the mth
the whole of Great Britain, large par&of Wart Germany, France*Turkey,
and other countries serving as advance missile bases. When the words
"Give me liberty or give me death" are spoken, this is what is meant.
When Patrick Hemy spoke in Williamsburg in the eighteenth mturg.
war was s t i l l an acceptable means of settling disputes. It is no longer
acceptable, it it no longer settle anything.
Yet this is the aItwnative. I t seems to me an impradial, not to say
immoral, alternative. It is certainly impractical to embark on a amme
which you h o w bas no dmmc of bringing you where you want to go.
I take it that American aims, in their simpleat expression, are to survive,
to prosper, and to c q the banner of M o m and justim into the world.
Wiping out half of the ppulation and most of the indusny and culture
of our nation would not appear to be a recommended way for accomplishing ru& tasks.
There are some who, f a d with these alternatives, choose war. One
of the most intelligent editors I know says, for example, that he thinks
defense of Berlin would be worth 60 or 70 million Amwiwn lives. When
reasonable men have thus looked the odds in the eye and opted for
atasmphe, the argument would appear to be ended. But the question
must still be amwered, by what right may we decide to destroy thc
annrries-old accumulation of dvilimtion and dewstate the world for
who knows how many genaations to come?

JustiAcrrtlons for p m n f miicie~
At thia point perhaps it would be as well

to have a brief look at the
justifications of our v
t policies. The main claim is that arms and
more arms are the only way to provide national security. Thh is a curi8

ullpubhh& P a F * 1980.

ous proposition. We have been spending larger and large^ amounts for
many years, and today we feel far less secure than when we started. Kenneth E. Bodding remarks that "unconditional national security
can
no longer be obtained by expenditon unilateral national defense,
no matter how great. , It is a commodity which is no longer on sale,
and which cannot be purchased at any price.'**
The next daim is that the t h e q of deterreuce h a proved itself; a
balance of terror exists, and we have had no war. This is an wen mom
curious argument. Botb sides have the capacity any day to upset the
balance by meat@ new weapons. What wiIl happen to the balance
when China and other ambitious nations get the bomb is spoken of in the
hushed tones reserved for the neardead. Presumably the world would
then be ruled by terror aIone. If we are so d
n that the kmowbalance
is the only way to be secure, we ought to be negotiating systems of inspection designd to make sure that the Russians are exactly as strong as we
are, and we as strong as they, and sharing our technologies and secrets

...

..

to this end.

A third pillar of present policy is desaibed in t h a classic phmes
of contemporary Newspeak, "arm to parley" and *hegotiate from
strength." m e Ameriam aptitude for confusing slogans with success is
at its highest here. We are nearing the hatf-trillion dolIar mark in arms
costs, and we are assured that in all the world there is none so mighty.
So negotiations should be running along at top speed But negotiations
are instead bogged down everywhere in the mashes of suspicion and
hate. The fact is that we do not know what we would like m achieve
by negotiation.
The fourth daim is related to the third. We are told that ironclad
arms control and inspection agreements are what we must have, otherwise we'll just have to keep on doing what we are doing. This bas +
s o r t of plausibility at k t glance. On closer examination we see that we
are setting up an impossible condition. The deadlock at Geneva rerid#
from the recognition of this ultimate impibiIity. There is no way,
for example, of detecting arsenals of germ, gas, and poison warfare.
Neither Russia nor this country appears disposed in the slightest to
take the Iead in the United Nations in establishing tbe minimum international machinery that would be needed to prevent a disarmed nation
from reaming if it decided to do so. T h e intense and complicated
quarrels about arms control make it evident that it will be far easier to
get rid of all arms than of some of them, or a few at a time, Behind all
the thunder about irondad agreemmts is the inesapable realization that
there is no way of destroying the knowIedge of how to make modmodern
insuumenta of war. Accompanying this is the realization that inspection
imIf is, in a well-known phrase, institutiomked discrust. An inspection
system, far from qmenting basic agreemetat, must always stand as a
reminder of perilous disagreement.
7fkmhar Paper, Church Pmce Union, Highland Park, W o Q , JW,
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A 6nal observation on the mythology of anas cmtrol and inspection:
The various system of control and inspection put before the world t h y
would be worked out primarily by the two great powers. But there are
many other nations whose rivalries are intense-hael and the Arab
world, India and Pakistan, China and its neighbors, and others. As things
now stand any one of these sub-systems could escape or disregard agree
men& on arms control-for will not we and Russia have our hands full
mntrolhg and inspecting each other? I t would not do to dapair
utterly of 6ually reaching some kind of agreement on control and inspection; but whether such an arrangement merits the great hope expressed for it seems dubious in the extreme.

Necesaitp for self-restraint
I conclude that we are deluding ourselves when we think that we
a n defend ?he undefendable, control the unmnmlktble, and inspect
the uninspectable. The v i W in todays great me1cdmma is not Russia,
not the United Stam, but the versatility of technology. If any system
of restraint and non-recourse to arma can be made w work in the face
of this versatility it will have to be self-imposed It will have to be an
honor qstem. The inspecting and controlling and policing will have
to be done by each nation as a matter of honor and good politia. Selfmtraint i s not d S d t when m know that the penal4 is death, out of
such realization seU-policing becomes habit. Few of us yield to the impulse to drive into the left-hand lane. We are not eoereed into driving
on the right. W e have got the habit of survival on the highway, all
except about 40,000 of us each year.
Thus one of the bases for unilateral disarmameat is self-restraint as
the pctical means of arms control, and confidence in its habit-forming
properties.
The world certainly needs a police force, and 1 should expect that
the United Nations in the fullness of time would find a way of providing
it. But the police force can only k made to work in a world where selfpolicing has become habitual, just as police forces in modern states
depend on the r a p t for Iaw and selfdiscipline of the majority of the
populae. If the authority of domestic polia was based on inspection of
homes it would soon turn out to be no authority, and the mult would
be either a police state or anarchy.

W h i a un4laterul d h n m u m e d rejected?
I think there are two reasons why uniIateral disarmament is not
taken seriousIy, both closely connected with the chief tenets of the U.S.
arms program mentioned earlier.
First, the U.S. can smreely be much interested in unilateral disarmament when it does not favor complete and general disarmament. If it
did, it would Ieap at Khrushchev's repeated offer to "work out any type
of mntrols" the West would like to have in refor our agreement to

total disarmament in four to five years. As I read the &den=, there b
little interest in Washington in any kind of disarmament, to say nothing
of total disarmament. We are opposed to any brand of disarmament
mainly, I repeat, because we cannot imagine how we would fare under
conditions of peaceful competition.
Let us, for example, consider the imagination at work in a dty like
Santa Barbara. How would this city, now replete with resear& into
p m t and future w d i c t , vote if given a choice between the presrent
situation and total disarmament with inspction? How would Ins Angel- Cwnry and its aircraft and missire industry vote? W e seem to
think that American iduence and American arms are an equation;
that we shouId be abIe to maintain our markets and prestige only so
long as they are secured by inventories of bombs. We keep taking about
the power of the demwatic doctrine in the battle for the minds of men.
But wen dose to home, as in Central America's tiny countrim, how do
we carry on our battle for the minds ofmen? By sending warship to the
Caribbean. It is interesting though sad to rdect that we did not make
even a gesture toward c~nsultingwith the Organization of Amerian
States before embarking our armada. W e should not have warships to
send if we disarmed unilaterally; what arguments would we use in
Central Ameria instead?
The other impediment to consideration of uniIateral disarmament
and, up to now, to almost any kind of disarmament, is the mass mediaour n e w s p a p and television. With scarcely a single important excep
tion they stand e n m d by present policies. There is no aitidsm.
What little debate p s on is about whether we are spending enough, and
on the right hardware. No propaganda package emitted by the Pentagon
seems to be too big to be swallowed by television and disgorged on the
public. Neither T V nor press points to nor tries to analyze even the more
blatant absuxdities-for example, the propition that we should simultaneously arm and disarm, or the m e 1 W p t i o n of the great bombs
as defense weapons. The concepts of security and defense themselves
have, in the mass media, kame sacred and anexaminable texts.
Even a television commentator or editorial writer should know that
there is no deb in thermonuclear war. They have, after alI, the direct
testimony of a President of the United States on this point. Yet any
statement made by '*ow
side," no matter how self-evidently nonsensical
it may be, is likely to be received with editorial raptures. At the same
time anything said by the other aide is condemned as instant propaganda.
So we have the u n m g spectacle of the network fmt filling our eyea
with p a from the Pentagon and them solemnly denying air time to
K h r d d x w on the ground that they do not want Americans to be taken
in by propaganda. It is the prew that demands of adidates an h
proachable ferocity toward Russia Since it h u abandoned its awn duty
m aitidze the so-called defense effort, the p m looh on other critics as
m a y or disloyat I suspect that a disintemted observer wodd not h d
much to c h m between in a comparison of the performance of the
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mtrolIed Russian prm and the h e r i a free prim in this artxi. It ir
unpleasant to think of a "party line" in the United States; is there some
other way to dedh it5
Related to the uncritical acceptance d the premiw and propam
of the cold war is the press's remorseless pormying of the Soviet as the
Ultimate Evil, now and forevermure. It is instructive to s p d a t e on
what the pms will do if, as strategists are already suwting, it becamea
politic for this munay to ally iwff with Russia against the awakening
leviathan, China. Until t h e n the story that the Soviet is pbning daily
to strike the West will be propagated seduIody with no evidence whatever to s u p p it. The press will also note indignantly that Russian
papers are d n g us warmongers who are demmhed to wipe Communism h m the face of the earth. In the black-and-whiteworld of the mass
media the idea of unilateral disarmament can expect to find no place.

A questton of m o d s
Up to this point my e h t has been to keep the argument practid:
against the armg race as an impractical way of achieving our gods, against
the mirage of foolproof inspection and arms controI, and for unilateral
disarmament as the most practi4 chance we bave of obtaining peace.
But at bottom I believe the question to be nor practial but moral.
There are many dramatic ways of p i n g the moral issue. Let me take
two sentence from a letter to an English newspaper. The letter says,
"One of my earliest memories is a
about the Lidice massacre, in
which the population of m e viIlage wm wiped out. I am now asked to
approve plans for the elimination of whole cities, if not whole countries,
and perhap wen of the human race."
But now I must confess that I do not know what to make of the
moral question. I believe in man's moraI sense, in his conscience as the
guide away from the wil and toward the good. My answer to the m o d
question is that I would not vote for nor contribute in any way to the
destruction of millions of people, their home, and their civilization no
matter what the pretext or provocation. This sounds mushy and sentimental. Yet there is great self-inmt, too. T h e guilt remaining after
such an action would be exauciating for a nation to live with. The s t a h
of Hirashima is on all Amerians today. Eut what of the tremendow
majority of my countrymen, a11 equipped with conscience9 and moral
sensibilities every bit as good as my own, whose answer to the question
about pressing the button is just the opposite one, and on whose express
consent our present polides are based? I like to think that my aversion
is moral, but perhaps- it H something else, perhap even garden-variety
cowardiaz
Then there is the undoubted fact that, with rare exceptions, the
Ieamed clergy and scholars of ethia bring their great Iearning and
prestige to the side of the a r m raca Theirs is a vast literature, and it
is doubtlw a blhd spot in me that 1 cannot follow their v e n t s ,
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for at the beginning of their artides I always think that they are going to
come to conclusions just opposite to those

they do in fact reach. Some of

my best friends are priests, preachas, and scholars, and many are greatly
troubled over the dilemma. 1 have no reawn to think that they are not
speaking out of tbe depths of their hearts and knowledge. But their
moral messages are ambiguous; at any rate, they do not get through to
me. Risking some injustim X may perhap say that such messages seem
to be paraphed with succinctna on a stamp recently announced by
the Post Oflice. The stamp is one of its "Credo" series. The inscription
reads "And this be our motto, in God is our trust." The picture on the
stamp is that of an exploding bomb.
La spite of the moral lessons taught by my elders and betters, I musrt
continue to put my faith in unilateral disarmament, for I believe peace
to be better than war, suruiual better than suicide, civiliaatim better than
barbarism, compassion better than vengeance. Unilateral action repre
senu thaw pmsibilities better tban any other approach that 1 know
about. Unilateral disarmament is far h m a perfect solution to history's
most tangled conundrum,but there is no perfect solution.

One more point on behalf of unilateral disarmament is a poiat that
is only second cousin to the practiml and moral arguments. Let us
assume, with the authom of Community of Fear, the continuation of
the cold war progrsun for year~ahead. I suggest that this would be the
next worst thing to war itself in ia &em. The cold war, as we have
seen, has already pretty well reduced public discussion in this country to
a dull chorus about the hated enemy and the overwbehiug might and
right of our side. Slogam have been so aucmsfully substituted for the
m t h that efEorts to peek behind them are denounced as treasonable, or
as debilitating to the general "will to resist," If public discmion has
already become so corrupted, think what it will be after another d e d e
of increasing economic dependence on the arm race and haeasing
pychological dqmdence on the image of the Enemy1
Under the impact of the arms race, Science has become prime
minister of the realm. Wisdom, politics, and morals have all been ousted
horn our highest councils by technology, whose injunction is to do whatever it is p i b l e to do. T h e result is a dehumanization of society, and
the brutalizing of us all. None resists when a new military horror is
developed; on the contrary, applauae rolls aam the land. W e are well
content to h o w that we now have the ability to overkill Russia eight or
nine times. How long has it been since any political leader has inquired
whether it is wise to continue on our present murae? The questions of
our kaders are of quite a different order: shodd not we do whatever it
is possible for us to do? If we don't, the Russiana wil1, won't they? Wisdom has apparently been put on the shelf for the duration, perhap
forever. So far has the dehumanization of man progressed that few even

notiae any more that wisdom and compassion have gone, and that reason
iu dispossessed by tec.bno1ag-y. The degrading of our common life is so
well along that it is hard to imagine a weapon development tbat would
ocasion general public revulsion.

I have tried to say what I believe to be promised by the continuation
of our p m n t prog-,.
I have sought to sugpt that self-righteousness,
that ugliest of sentiments, is at the heart of our folly. My deepest conviction is that war will come if we persist in wild hhyporrisy, slopneering,
aud enemy-building, if we persist in following militaxy technology wherever it takes us, and e ~ p a i a l l yif we persist in making any step toward
peace conditional on a longer step by the other parties involved in the
cold war. For the United States has no monopoly on df-righteousness
and exaggerated notions of self-interest, and the other parties will themselves think of making con-ions
only on condition of unconcedable
concmions by the West.
Unilateral disarmament has been attacked as the counsel of cowaxdice. Yet it would take gxeat courage and -on and con6dence in American ideas to put down our a r m for the sake of humanity. It takes neithex
m g e nor vision, only taxes, to keep on our present course.
Unilaterd disarmament thus s e a m to me dictated by practical selfinterest and by a moral concern for civilization and for the future of

humanity itseIf. These cannot be served by themnonudear war. The
Third World War w i l l produce no victor, only the vanquished. No one
has shown how thermonuclear war can assure &hesurvival, to say nothing
of the triumph, of Amerimn institutions and values. Unilateral disa~mamend would be a grmt nation's attempt to turn away from technology
toward wisdom, away from a m e d force toward new coficeptions of
politics and power. We may only hope and work against the fatalism that
ours is the Iast generation., condemned by its own fantastic ingenuity and
its disregard of humility and reason: in Auden's words,

W e are lived by powers we pretend to underatand;
They arrange our lives; it is they who direct at the end
The memy bullet, the sickness, or even our land.
It ia their tomorrow hangs over the earth of the living,
And all that we wish fm our friends; but existence t believing
W e know for whom we mourn and who is grieving.
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